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1.

Introduction
The recent Asian financial crisis has rekindled considerable interest in examining the

behavior of international reserve hoarding. The fundamental rationale for holding international
reserves ranges from transaction demand, precautionary motives, collateral asset argument, and
mercantilist behavior. Although numerous studies have attempted to unravel the relevance of
these factors, the debate on the determinants of international reserves is far from settled. The
difficulty of explicating international reserve holding behavior may be attributed to the anecdotal
view that the role and functionality of international reserves have evolved along with
developments in global financial markets. For instance, the holding of international reserves is
now increasingly susceptible to capital account transactions because of the continuing financial
globalization and innovative advancements in international capital markets. The recent financial
crisis also signified the importance of expectations, policy credibility, and institutional structures
in determining the adequate level of international reserves.1
One of the unique features of the Asian financial crisis is that some economies in the
region have been accumulating international reserves at an astonishing rate in the aftermath of
the event. The first few years of the 21st century have witnessed an unprecedented growth of
global international reserves – a growth rate of over 114.9% between 2000 and 2006, which was
driven by a handful of economies. During the period, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan
have increased their international reserve holdings by 449%, 114%, 115%, 151% and 115%,
respectively.2 Figure 1 presents the evolution of international reserve holdings by the world and
some selected economies.
The phenomenal build-up by these economies has revived research interest in the
determinants of international reserves. Some studies focus on the buffer-stock and precautionary
demand motivation and incorporate the crisis-induced costs of output and investment
contractions (Aizenman et al. 2007; Lee, 2004). Dooley et al. (2005), in a series of papers,
resurrects the mercantilist view and suggest that international reserve accumulation in East Asia
is a consequence of export-oriented growth strategy and the absence of a well-functioning
domestic and/or regional financial system. Aizenman and Lee (2007) empirically confirm the
1

Some recent studies on the recent crisis are Krugman (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Chang
and Velasco (1999) and Dooley (2000).
2
Japan, China, and Russia are the three largest holders of international reserves as of 2006. During this
period, Russia and India increased international reserves by 933% and 286%, respectively. Some developed
countries also experienced a sharp increase such as Australia (154.4%) and Denmark (69.9%).
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mercantilist motivation, but find that, compared with the precautionary demand, the mercantilist
motivation accounts for a relatively small amount of international reserve hoarding. Other
determinants for international reserve holding considered in recent studies include short-term
external debts, financial development, and political and institutional factors.3
Figure 1: International Reserves – the World and Selected Economies
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The recent developments in the literature on international reserves have raised a few
questions. For instance, to what extent do these new factors help us understand the observed
holding of international reserves? Are these new factors complements or substitutes for the “old”
traditional economic variables? Do these new factors explain observed holdings of international
reserves even before they were identified in the literature? Have the determinants of international
reserve holding changed over time? Answers to these questions should shed some insight on the
evolution of the behavior of demand for international reserves. In addition, an empirical analysis
should allow us to assess whether economies are holding deficient or excessive levels of
international reserves.
3

See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2001, 2003, 2004), Alfaro, et al. (2003), and Greenspan (1999).
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To investigate these questions, we conduct an extensive empirical analysis using data
from more than 100 economies during the period of 1975 to 2005. In designing the empirical
architecture, we take into account of some known results in the literature. For instance, previous
studies have documented that developed and developing economies display different demand for
international reserves (Frenkel 1974a). Others have evidenced that the nature of the demand
behaviors for international reserves has changed in the presence of significant historical events
such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and oil crises (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1988;
Frenkel, 1980; Lizondo and Mathieson 1987). Most recently, Aizenman et al. (2007) also
identify structural changes in the Korean international reserve holding after the Asian financial
crisis. Hence, in this study, we sort the economies into two groups, the developed and developing
economies, and investigate the determinants of the demand for international reserves in
non-overlapping sample periods that are partitioned by major crisis episodes.
Following the development in the theoretical literature, we consider four groups of
explanatory variables: traditional macro variables, financial variables, institutional variables, and
dummy variables that control for individual economies’ characteristics. To anticipate the results,
we confirm that the demand for international reserves of developed economies is different from
that of developing economies. The set of (significant) explanatory variables also changes across
different sample periods. There is evidence that the holding pattern of international reserves has
been affected by the occurrences of the debt crisis in the 1980s, and the Tequila crisis and the
Asian crisis in the 1990s.
Among all the factors we considered, the propensity to import, a proxy for trade openness,
garners the largest number of significant coefficient estimates across different specifications and
sample periods. However, its explanatory power has been declining over time for both developed
and developing economies. On the other hand, the explanatory power of financial variables,
including those related to external financing, has been increasing over time.
Our evidence suggests that, compared with developing economies, the developed
economies enjoy a “premium” in accumulating international reserves since the early 1980s – that
is, they could afford to hold lower levels of international reserves, ceteris paribus. Moreover, our
estimation results present only limited evidence that East Asian economies including China and
Japan are hoarding an excessive amount of international reserves.
A brief review of these determinants of international reserves is given in the next section.
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Section 3 contains the main regression results. It presents the empirical framework and discusses
results from different sample periods and different country groups. Additional analyses are
reported in Section 4. Specifically, we compare the patterns of international reserve holdings
between developed and developing economies. Also, in view of the recent debate, we assess
whether some economies are holding an excessively high level of international reserves in the
recent period. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.

2.

A Brief Review on the Determinants of International reserves
To trace theoretical developments and to facilitate comparison, we group the

determinants of international reserves into three categories: traditional macro variables, financial
variables, and institutional variables, Readers familiar with the effects of these variables may
choose to proceed directly to Section 3.
The group of traditional macro variables consists of the propensity to import, volatility of
real export receipts, international reserve volatility, the opportunity cost of holding international
reserves, real per capita GDP, and population. These variables have been commonly considered
as determinants since the 1960s. In the early stage of theorization, the demand for international
reserves is mainly attributed to the need for accommodating imbalances arising from trade
account transactions, which are the main type of balance of payments transactions before the
development of the modern international capital market.
Heller (1966) argues that the demand for international reserves should be negatively
related to the marginal propensity to import because a higher propensity to import (m) implies a
smaller marginal cost of balance of payments adjustment (i.e., 1/m), and, thereby, a lower
demand for international reserves. However, most empirical exercises – including Heller (1966)
himself – use the average, and not the marginal, propensity to import. Frenkel (1974b) points out
that the average propensity to import, i.e., the imports-to-GDP ratio, measures trade openness
and, therefore, should have a positive effect on the demand for international reserves because of
the precautionary holding to accommodate external shocks through trade channels.
The role of international reserve volatility is illustrated by the buffer stock model of
international reserves. Extending the model for cash holding, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981)
illustrate the effect of international reserve volatility in a stochastic inventory control setting. In
some studies, the volatility of real export receipts is used as an alternative proxy for the

4

uncertainty of balance of payments (Kelly, 1970).
The opportunity cost of holding international reserves, which is commonly measured by
the difference between the local interest rate and the US interest rate, has been included in
models that compare the costs and benefits of holding international reserves (Heller, 1966;
Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). The effect of the opportunity cost is quite inconspicuous in the
empirical literature, mainly due to the difficulty in assigning a single interest rate for
international reserve assets while accounting for their risks.4
Following Aizenman and Marion (2003), Edison (2003), and Lane and Burke (2001), real
per capita GDP and population are included to capture the size effect on international reserve
holding. In view of the Baumol (1952) square-root rule for transaction demand, we expect these
size variables to have a negative coefficient.
The second group of explanatory variables includes money supply, external debts, and
capital flows. The use of money in explaining the hoarding of international reserves can be dated
back to the 1950s. Courchene and Youssef (1967), for example, appeal to the monetarist model
of balance of payments to justify the use of money in their international reserve regression.5
More recently, de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) argue that money stock in an
economy is a proxy for potential capital flight by domestic residents and, therefore, can be a
measure of the intensity of the “internal drain.”6
The implications of external debts and capital flows on the holding of international
reserves have received considerable attention after the Asian financial crisis. While capital
inflows can enhance economic growth by supplementing domestic savings and/or financial
intermediaries and improving the efficiency of domestic financial markets, a sudden capital flow
reversal can devastate an economy, trigger a crisis, and cause significant output losses.7
Generally, developing economies with inefficient and immature financial sectors are vulnerable

4

Sometimes, the difference between the yields on the US and domestic government bonds is used to capture
the opportunity cost effect. In our exercise, due to data availability, we use the differentials between the U.S.
Treasury bill rates and domestic lending rates.
5
One version of the “global monetarism” argues that an increase in international reserves is driven by an
excess demand for money, which implies a balance of payments surplus whereas a fall in international reserve
holding is caused by an excess supply of money, which implies a balance of payments deficit (Johnson, 1958).
6
de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) refer to the research on the Early Warning System and argue
that the international reserves-to-M2 ratio is a reasonable measure of international reserve adequacy.
7
Edwards (2004) analyzes the sudden stop of capital inflows and current account performance in the last
three decades. Caballero and Panageas (2004) suggest that international reserve accumulation is not the best
insurance against sudden stops.
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to the adverse effect of capital reversals. Thus, it is conceived that economies with a high level of
exposure to external financing, whether they are debts, FDI, or portfolio flows, should hold a
high level of international reserves to reduce its vulnerability to financial crises and to boost
confidence in their currencies (Aizenman et al., 2007; Feldstein, 1999).8
Dooley, et al. (2005) offers an alternative view on the link between capital flows and
international reserves. These authors argue that under the current international financial
architecture (the “Bretton Woods II system”), emerging market economies accumulate
international reserves to secure FDI inflows from the center country, i.e., the United States. In
other words, the economies in the “periphery” hold international reserves to ensure importation
of financial intermediaries from abroad. According to this view, capital inflows are positively
correlated with holdings of international reserves.
The effect of capital flows on international reserve accumulation, however, is not
unambiguous. Besides the insurance motive, international reserves can be viewed as a substitute
for external financing. In this case, an economy may hold a lower level of international reserves
if it has secured access to international capital markets and, thus, the correlation between the two
variables is expected to be negative.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) note that the types, volumes, and directions of capital
flows have changed over time. Hence, the use of an aggregate variable may not capture the
differential effects of different types of capital flows. In the following, we examine the individual
effects of net external liabilities (i.e., external liabilities minus assets) in debt financing, portfolio
equity financing, and FDI, as well as their growth rates.
The third group of explanatory variables is institutional variables. It has been argued that
institutional characteristics such as corruption, political stability, and capital controls affect the
holding of international reserves. Aizenman and Marion (2003, 2004) and Alfaro et al. (2003),
for example, show that holdings of international reserves are influenced by political uncertainty
and corruption. Our empirical exercise includes a selected group of institutional variables
pertaining to financial openness and political/societal conditions.
In addition to these three groups of explanatory variables, our sample also includes four
types of dummy variables to account for other characteristics of the economies. The first type is
8

In general, it is suggested to cover one year amortized value of various types of liabilities over a wide range
of possible outcomes. The role of short-term external debts is brought to the center stage by the popular
Greenspan-Guidotti-rule (Greenspan, 1999).
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the exchange rate regime dummy variable.9 The common wisdom suggests that economies with
fixed exchange rates and crawling pegs have incentives to hold international reserves to fight
against exchange rate market pressures.10 The second type is a geographic dummy variable. Its
inclusion is motivated by the folklore that economies in certain geographic regions such as East
Asia tend to hoard high levels of international reserves especially after the Asian financial crisis.
The third type is the crisis dummy variable. The variable is meant to capture the effects of a
currency crisis, a banking crisis, or a twin crisis on hoarding of international reserves.11 The
fourth type is an interaction variable that assumes a value of one if the economy is located in a
region which is inflicted by a crisis. This dummy variable is included to evaluate the possible
contagion effect of crises on international reserves accumulation.
3.

Empirical Analysis

3.1

Model Specifications
In the following empirical exercise, we consider a normalized international reserve

variable given by ri ,t = Ri ,t / GDPi ,t , where Ri ,t is a generic notation of economy i’s holding of

international reserves and GDPi ,t is economy i’s gross domestic product at time t. Both variables
are measured in U.S. dollars. Scaling international reserves facilitates comparison across countries
of different sizes. For brevity, we call the ratio ri ,t international reserves. The three types of
determinants of international reserves are denoted by X i ,t (= {xi ,k ,t ; k = 1,..., N x }) which contains
the traditional macro variables, Yi ,t (= { yi ,k ,t ; k = 1,..., N y } ) the financial variables, and Z i ,t
9

Frenkel (1980) and Flood and Marion (2002), for example, report that exchange rate arrangements have
effects on the holding of international reserves. Lane and Burke (2001), on the other hand, find no significant
association between exchange rate regimes and international reserves.
10
In this study, the Reinhart-Rogoff (2002) index is used to construct the exchange rate regime dummy
variable. Their index ranges from 1 “no separate legal tender,” to 14 “Freely falling” (with increasing flexibility of
exchange rate movement) and is a “de facto” index in contrast to IMF’s “de jure” exchange rate regime
classification. In this paper, we aggregate these categories into three; namely “floating,” “Crawling Peg,” and
“Fixed/Pegged.”
11
The currency crisis dummy variable is derived from the conventional exchange rate market pressure (EMP)
index pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1996). The EMP index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes
in the nominal exchange rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal interest rate. The weights
are inversely related to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample countries, and adjustment
is made for the countries that experienced hyperinflation following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For countries
without data to compute the EMP index, the currency crisis classifications in Glick and Hutchison (2001) and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) are used. The banking crisis dummy variable is based on Caprio and Klingebiel
(2003). The twin crisis effect is examined by an interaction variable between a currency crisis and a banking crisis
(Hutchison and Noy, 2002).
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(= {zi ,k ,t ; k = 1,..., N z } ) the institutional variables. The dummy variables that capture other
characteristics of the economies are collected under Di ,t (= {di ,k ,t ; k = 1,..., N d } ). The Appendix
provides a complete list of variables, their definitions, their sources, and a description of their
period averages.
We consider cross-sectional behavior for three non-overlapping sample periods; namely
1975-1981, 1983-1993, and 1999-2005. The sample periods exclude the years inflicted by the
three major financial crises; the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, the 1994 Tequila crisis, and the
1997-8 Asian financial crisis.12 For each of the three sample periods, we employ the period
averages of ri ,t , X it , Yi ,t , Z i ,t , and Di ,t and label them ri , X i , Yi , Z i , and Di ,
respectively. The use of period averages allows us to avoid complexity that arises from unknown
and, possibly varying dynamics, and focus on the (time-)average behavioral relationship.
The effects of these variables on hoarding of international reserves are studied using the
following regression equations:

ri = c + X i' α + ε i ,

(1)

ri = c + X i' α + Di' δ + ε i ,

(2)

ri = c + X i' α + Yi ' β + Di' δ + ε i , and

(3)

ri = c + X i' α + Yi ' β + Z i' γ + Di' δ + ε i .

(4)

The coefficient vectors α , β , γ , and δ are conformable to the associated explanatory
variables. The intercept and disturbance term are given by c and ε i , respectively.
Specification (1) is an international reserve demand equation of the 1970s vintage. The
economy characteristic dummy variables are included in specification (2). Specification (3)
includes the financial variables ( Yi ) that are often referred to in the recent discussion on the
demand for international reserves. The effects of institutional factors ( Z i ) are examined in
specification (4). These four specifications allow us to gauge the relative and incremental
contributions of the different groups of explanatory variables.
We divide the sample of 126 economies into two groups: one with 22 developed

12

We leave out the two years between the 1994 and 1997-98 crises since they are too short for a serious
investigation. In subsection 3.3, we present robust test results from the samples that encompass the left-out period.
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economies and the other with 104 developing economies. Due to data availability, the actual
number of the economies included in the estimation varies across the three sample periods, but
for any given sample period, it is set fixed across the four specifications to facilitate comparison.

3.2

Estimation Results
The estimation results for the developed economies are presented in Table 1-1. The

results pertaining to the regression equations (1) to (4) are respectively presented under the
columns labeled (1) to (4) for each of the three periods; namely 1975-1981, 1983-93, and
1999-2005. We estimated these specifications sequentially and kept only significant variables in
each step. Those for the developing economies are presented in the same format in Table 1-2.13

3.2.1 The 1975-1981 Period
For the developed economies, two traditional macro variables, real per capita GDP and
the propensity to import, are found to be significant in the 1975-81 period and explain 47% of
variations in international reserves held by the developed economies. The signs of coefficient
estimates are consistent with those predicted in the literature. The transaction demand for
international reserves, on a per capita basis, falls as the real per capita income level rises (Heller
1968). The proxy for trade openness and the degree of external vulnerability given by the
(average) propensity to import has the expected positive coefficient (Frenkel, 1974b).
The significant 1982 crisis dummy variable indicates that, in retrospect, the developed
economies that experienced a currency crisis in 1982 held lower levels of international reserves
than the non-crisis economies before the event.
The significant money effect (M2/GDP) is in accordance with the monetary interpretation
of the balance of payments and also with the view that money supply is a proxy for internal drain
of international reserves during the crisis period. Nonetheless, we are not sure to what extent the
internal drain interpretation is relevant for these economies. In any case, inclusion of M2 leads to
a noticeable increase in the adjusted R-square coefficient.
Interestingly, for this group of economies, institutional development does not have an
effect on the behavior of international reserves holding back in 1975-81. Thus, the specification

13

The economies included under each of these periods are listed in the Appendix.
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Table 1-1: Estimation Results for Developed economies; 1975 – 1981, 1983 – 1993, 1999 – 2005
1983 – 1993

1975 – 1981
Real per capita GDP
Propensity to import

(1)
-0.107
[0.057]*
0.245
[0.055]***

(2)
-0.13
[0.055]**
0.196
[0.065]***

(3)
-0.131
[0.039]***
0.321
[0.055]***

(4)

(1)

0.272
[0.068]***

(2)

0.3
[0.101]***

(3)

0.357
[0.080]***

1999 – 2005
(4)

(1)

-0.02
[0.007]***
0.009
[0.004]*
-0.061
[0.037]*

-0.058
[0.027]**

-0.028
[0.030]
-0.029
[0.038]

Fixed/Pegged regime

-0.049
[0.032]
-0.063
[0.025]**

0.132
[0.052]**

0.33
[0.056]***

Net portfolio
liabilities
Leftist government
De jure capital acct.
openness
Constant
# Observations
Adj. R-square

(4)

-0.017
[0.006]**
0.007
[0.004]

-0.017
[0.007]**
0.007
[0.004]

-0.026
[0.004]***
0.01
[0.003]***

0.131
[0.011]***

0.136
[0.010]**
*

0.122
[0.008]***

-0.018
[0.015]

-0.029
[0.012]**

-0.049
[0.023]**
-0.089
[0.025]***

Crawling peg regime
M2 / GDP

(3)

0.444
[0.071]***

Population (in log)
International reserve
volatility
Crisis in 1982

(2)

0.363
[0.060]***

0.047
[0.018]**

1.044
[0.552]*

1.283
[0.547]**

1.183
[0.377]***

0.022
[0.018]

0.022
[0.019]

-0.198
[0.047]***

-0.257
[0.054]***

0.365
[0.114]***

0.321
[0.098]***

21

21

21

22

22

22

22

22

22

0.326
[0.111]**
*
22

0.47

0.52

0.72

0.18

0.12

0.72

0.79

0.28

0.65

0.65

NOTES: Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels, respectively. The column
headings (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to the model specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) in the text. (4) is absent under the 1999-2005 sample period
because there is no significant institutional variables.

10

0.055
[0.016]***
0.323
[0.040]***
22
0.83

Table 1-2: Estimation Results for Developing economies, 1975 – 1981, 1983 – 1993, 1999 – 2005
1975 – 1981
Propensity to import

(1)
0.314
[0.035]***

(2)
0.342
[0.037]***

(3)
0.349
[0.020]***

1999 – 2005

1983 – 1993
(4)
0.105
[0.058]*

International reserve
volatility
Opportunity cost

(1)
0.329
[0.044]***
0.016
[0.004]***

(2)
0.332
[0.039]***
0.013
[0.003]***

(3)
0.344
[0.037]***
0.009
[0.003]***

(4)
0.329
[0.040]***
0.01
[0.003]***

(1)

-0.394
[0.142]***

Crisis during period

-0.072
[0.018]***

-0.053
[0.014]***

0.05
[0.017]***

0.049
[0.017]***

Fixed/Pegged regime
-0.433
[0.056]***

-0.059
[0.022]***
0.055
[0.029]*
0.359
[0.197]*

Creditor x Net debt
liabilities
Growth in net
debt liabilities
M2 / GDP
Net portfolio
liabilities
Anti-corruption

-0.014
[0.005]**
0.262
[0.057]***

De facto capital acct.
openness
Leftist-government
Constant
# Observations
Adj. R-square

-0.005
[0.014]
53
0.49

0.007
[0.015]
53
0.57

0.061
[0.021]***
53
0.69

(4)

-0.364
[0.127]***

-0.111
[0.044]**

-0.117
[0.047]**

-0.091
[0.029]***
-0.021
[0.047]

-0.073
[0.022]***
-0.037
[0.024]

-0.077
[0.023]***
-0.05
[0.027]*

0.203
[0.029]***
-0.701
[0.045]***

0.201
[0.029]***
-0.717
[0.049]***

0.142
[0.034]***
76
0.61

-0.065
[0.027]**
0.164
[0.040]***
76
0.63

0.05
[0.017]***

Latin America

-0.204
[0.056]***

(3)

-0.058
[0.014]***

Banking crisis in 1982

Net debt liabilities

(2)

0.072
[0.016]***
53
0.85

-0.06
[0.021]***
0.06
[0.029]**
0.358
[0.197]*

0.002
[0.001]**

-0.028
[0.015]*
80
0.63

-0.036
[0.013]***
80
0.67

-0.011
[0.015]
80
0.71

-0.01
[0.016]
80
0.71

0.268
[0.035]***
76
0.1

0.292
[0.044]***
76
0.13

NOTES: Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels, respectively. The column
headings (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to the model specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) in the text. (4) is absent under the 1999-2005 sample period
because there is no significant institutional variables.
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(4) is omitted for this sample period.
For the developing economies (Table 1-2), the propensity to import again enters
significantly with the expected sign. However, that is the only macroeconomic variable that
enters the estimation significantly although it alone explains 49% of the variability of
international reserve holdings. The result signifies the importance of trade account transactions
for these economies.
The experience of a currency crisis during the period is found to be associated with a fall
in the holding of international reserves.14 As the first generation crisis model predicts (Krugman,
1979; Flood and Garber, 1984), currency crises involve severe reductions in international
reserves holding.
The ratio of net debt liabilities to GDP is the only significant financial variable for
developing economies in this period. Neither the growth rate of net debt liabilities, nor the ratio
of short-term external debts to GDP is found to be significant, suggesting that the level of
external debts, but not its growth rate or its maturity structure, matters. The negative coefficient
on net debt liabilities indicates that net borrowers tend to hold lower levels of international
reserves.15 The evidence suggests that international reserves and external debts can be viewed as
substitutes. Another possible interpretation is that higher levels of external debts increase the
default risk and thus, lead to capital outflow and a drawdown of international reserves.
Unfortunately, we are not able to disentangle these two interpretations.16
Two institutional variables, the indexes for corruption and de facto financial openness,
are found to be significant. The effect of corruption on the holding of international reserves is
different from the one reported in Aizenman and Marion (2003, 2004).17 A higher value of our
corruption index means an environment less favorable to corruption. Our results indicate that a
less corrupt economy holds a lower level of international reserves. A likely interpretation is that
an economy with a good reputation of having less corruption would need fewer international

14

The “Dummy for crisis during the period” assigns a value of unity to economies that experienced a crisis
during the 1975-81 period and, therefore, is different from the 1982 crisis dummy variable.
15
Positive (Negative) net external financial liabilities correspond to net receivers (providers) of external
finances.
16
The use of the ratio of external debts to GDP from the World Bank/BIS/OECD dataset on external debts
gives qualitatively similar results. In the text, we report results pertaining to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
dataset because it offers a better coverage than the World Bank/BIS/OECD dataset.
17
To be exact, Aizenman and Marion focused on political corruption, which may have a different implication
for the holding of international reserves.
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reserves to demonstrate its fundamental soundness.
It is interesting to find that financial openness (measured by the ratio of total cross-border
capital flows to GDP) and international reserve holding are positively related. The result mirrors
the recently advanced view that, to preempt potential capital flight, developing economies need
to hold more international reserves when they are financially integrated with the global market.
Our results suggest that developing economies in 1975-1981 already held international reserves
in a way consistent with this type of precautionary motivation.

3.2.2 The 1983-1993 Period
For the developed economies in the 1983-1993 period (Table 1-1), the propensity to
import is the only significant macro variable. Its coefficient estimates are generally larger than
the ones in the previous sample period. Nevertheless, the variable explains a much smaller
proportion of international reserve variation than the two macro variables did in the previous
period.
Interestingly, economies with a fixed or peg exchange rate regime tend to hold fewer
international reserves. The result follows from either a credible peg with sound economic
conditions or the tendency to intervene under a non-pegged arrangement. It is likely that both
reasons contribute to the observed result for the developed economies.
As it did in the previous sample period, the 1982 crisis dummy variable has negative
estimates. Even though not all of them are significant, these crisis-inflicted economies tend to
hold lower levels of international reserves.
The M2 variable continues to be the only significant financial variable for this group of
economies while its coefficient estimates are slightly larger than those in the previous period.
More importantly, inclusion of this variable improves the goodness of fit dramatically.
Among the institutional variables, the dummy variable for the economies with a leftist
government enters significantly; developed economies with leftist governments hold more
international reserves. This finding appears contradictory to the common belief that a leftist
government tends to spend more and incur current account deficits, and thereby leads to a lower
level of international reserves (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Nonetheless, the argument is possibly
more relevant to developing economies than developed ones since the former has limited access
to international financing.
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Again, developing economies are also found to be driven by a different set of
determinants in this period (Table 1-2). In this period, not just the propensity to import, but also
international reserve volatility enters significantly. These two macroeconomic variables account
for a large proportion (63%) of cross-economy international reserve variability.
While there is no sign of a currency crisis effect, the experience of a banking crisis in
1982 is associated with an increase in the hoarding of international reserves. That is, in the
aftermath of a banking crisis, the crisis-inflicted economy tends to increase its holding of
international reserves. The finding is different from the crisis effect noted for developed
economies in Table 1.1.
For this sample period, the data from developing economies allow us to discriminate the
behaviors between net creditors and net debtors.18 That is, net debtor economies may have an
incentive to hold more or fewer international reserves, depending on whether they perceive
international reserves an insurance or a substitute to external finances. Net creditor developing
economies, on the other hand, would not have such incentives. To this end, we create a dummy
variable for net creditor economies (i.e., those with negative net debt liabilities) and interact it
with the net debt liabilities variable. The effects of these variables are reported in columns (7)
and (8).
The results suggest that, for the net debtor developing economies, the level of
international reserves is inversely related to the amount of net liabilities; international reserves
and external debts are substitutes. The coefficient estimate, however, is much smaller compared
to the one from the previous sample period. Net creditor economies, on the other hand, appear to
be unresponsive to net debt liabilities; the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is about
the same magnitude as that of the level term with an opposite sign, indicating an essentially zero
coefficient.
Besides their level, the growth of net debt liabilities is found to be a significant
determinant; the faster the net liabilities increase, the more international reserves the developing
economy would build up.19 According to the coefficient estimates, the net debt liabilities effect
is much weaker than its growth effect. Thus, on the margin, a rise in net debt liabilities will lead
to an increase in the holding of international reserves, which can be served as implicit collaterals.
18

In the 1975-1981 sample, there is no creditor developing economy.
The variable for the growth of net debt liabilities was also interacted with the creditor dummy variable.
However, the interaction term was found to be insignificant.

19
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Among the institutional variables, only the de facto capital account openness remains to
be a significant determinant – however, its magnitude is now much smaller.

3.2.3 The 1999-2005 Period
Population and international reserve volatility are the two significant macro determinants
for the developed economies in the post-Asian financial crisis period (Table 1-1). The two
variables have expected effects on the holdings of international reserves. Compared with real per

capita GDP, population captures another dimension of the size effect. The negative estimates are
in accordance with the perceived wisdom that the larger the population size, the smaller the (per

capita) demand for international reserves would be. Also, the positive effect of international
reserve volatility is consistent with the model of, say, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981).20 In passing,
we can note that a) the propensity to import is no longer a significant explanatory variable in this
period, and that b) compared with macro variables in the two previous periods, these two macro
variables have a fairly low explanatory power.
The crawling peg dummy variable is the only significant characteristics dummy variable.
The positivity of its coefficient estimate is supportive of the “unstable middle” hypothesis, which
asserts that crawling peg regimes are more prone to currency crises than flexible or fixed
exchange rate regimes (Willett, 2003). The idea is that economies with crawling pegged
exchange rates, and difficulties in establishing credibility, have to hold a higher level of
international reserves to maintain their exchange rate regimes.
Among the financial variables, M2 (relative to GDP) is no longer significant in this
period. Instead, the net value of portfolio liabilities is a significantly negative determinant. The
negative sign suggests that these economies regard international reserves and portfolio flows as
substitutes. The substitutability appears to be a debtor economy’s phenomenon because the
dummy variable for the creditor economies, those which provide portfolio financing, is not found
to be significant.
The relevance of financial openness is confirmed by the significance of the Chinn-Ito
index reported in column (4).21 Its positive coefficient estimate underlines the precautionary
20

A dummy variable was constructed for Japan’s international reserve volatility, which is an extreme outlier.
A larger value of this measure means a higher level of capital account openness. The index is a reciprocal
of regulatory restrictions on cross-border financial transactions and is based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration
reported in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). See Chinn and Ito
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motive to guard against adverse capital flows under an open capital account regime. The finding
appears consistent with the recent trend of financial globalization.
Interestingly, similar to the case of developed economies, the propensity to import
variable is also found to be insignificant for developing economies (Table 1-2) in the post-Asian
financial crisis period. The disappearance of the significant propensity to import effect seems not
to be an isolated instance. The result can be attributed to the shift of attention from trade to
financial (and structural) factors occurring in the aftermath of the crisis. More data are required
to assess if the absence of the propensity to import effect is a transitory or a permanent
phenomenon.
The opportunity cost of holding international reserves is now the only significant macro
variable – a high opportunity cost discourages the hoarding of international reserves. However, it
is not clear why the cost consideration only shows up in the recent period estimation. The
deterioration of the effect of macro variables is reflected by adjusted R-square estimates. The
macro variable in the 1999-2005 period explains only 10% of the variations in international
reserve holdings; the lowest among the 12 cases presented in Table 1-2.
The economies in Latin America and those with pegged or fixed exchange rate systems
tend to hold less international reserves.22 Among the financial variables, the M2 and the ratio of
net portfolio liabilities are significant. It is the first time the M2 effect is detected for developing
economies. The finding echoes the recent interpretation that money stock can be a measure of
internal drain (de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001). The estimated effect of net portfolio
liabilities in Table 1-2 is qualitatively similar to the one for developed economies, but is larger in
magnitude.23 The result suggests that external equity financing for developing has a larger effect
than for developed economies.
The significant institutional variable in this sample period is different from those in other
periods in Table 1-2. During the 1999-2005 period, the developing economies with a leftist
government tend to hold less international reserves. Recall that developed economies with a
leftist government in the 1983 – 93 period tend to hold more international reserves (Table 1-1).
As noted in the previous subsection, a negative coefficient estimate is in accordance with the

(2008) for a detailed discussion. The index is viewed as a de jure index on capital account openness.
22
The result pertaining to the Latin American economies is not driven by the crisis experienced by, say,
Argentina in this period. The negative effect remains when countries like Argentina and Brazil are dummied out.
23
The interaction with the dummy variable for creditor countries is found to be insignificant.
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belief that a leftist government is with a lower level of international reserves because it tends to
have large fiscal expenses and current account deficits (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Once again,
our results reveal the differences in the behaviors of developed and developing economies.

3.3

Discussions

3.3.1 Varying Explanatory Power
The estimation results show that the determinants of international reserve holding are
different between developed and developing economies and vary quite substantially across
different periods. The propensity to import is the variable that shows up with most significant
coefficient estimates for both developed and developing economies. However, its effect virtually
disappears in the post-Asian financial crisis period. Further, there is a discernable change in the
coefficient estimates of the propensity to import variable across different model specifications
and sample periods.
Figure 2: Incremental Explanatory Power of the Determinants
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The explanatory power of these factors is not stable over time either. Figure 2 presents
the incremental contributions of the four groups of explanatory variables implied by adjusted
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R-square estimates. That is, the bars in the figure show the incremental change in the adjusted
R-square estimate when a group of explanatory variables is sequentially added to the estimation.
A few observations stand out.
First, in the 30-year span, the group of macro variables displays the most significant drop
in explanatory power. Its contributions to the adjusted R-square estimate fall from 47% in the
1975-1981 period to 28% in the 1999-2005 period for the developed economies and from 63% in
the 1983 – 93 period to merely 10% in the last period for the developing economies. The fact that
the group of significant macro variables changes across periods makes it difficult to track the
evolution of a variable’s impact. Nonetheless, the results tend to support the notion that the
propensity to import effect is declining over time.
Second, for the developing economies, the incremental explanatory power of the
financial variables increases rapidly to the level of 48% in the 1999-2005 period. The result
reflects the growing importance of capital and financial transactions amid the continuing
financial liberalization and globalization for developing economies. The developed economies,
on the other hand, see the incremental explanatory power of the financial variables reaches its
top level of 60% in the 1983-1993 period and then drops to zero after the Asian financial crisis.
Thus, after the crisis, the financial factors are more relevant for a developing economy’s demand
for international reserves than for a developed economy. Apparently, for both groups of
economies, the importance of financial variables is growing at the expense of the group of macro
variables.
Third, the results do not give a clear trend for the role of the characteristics dummies and
institutional variables. In the case of the developed economies, the institutional factors appear to
be gaining importance over the last two periods, whereas the opposite seems to hold for the
developing economies. In general, the role of institutional factors is minimal.
The role of financial and institutional factors deserves some comments. Until recently, the
literature has not paid much attention to the implications of financial and institutional factors.
Nevertheless, the effects of these two types of factors are found in the 1970s and 1980s samples.
Our results, however, should not be interpreted as strong evidence of the effect of a specific
financial or institutional factor. Indeed, we do not find a variable that shows up consistently in all
three periods under investigation. The effects of the significant financial and institutional
variables vary quite substantially across specifications. For example, the M2 effect is detected for
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developed economies in the first two sample periods but is only found for developing economies
in the most recent period.

3.3.2 Parameter Stability
The variability of model specifications and coefficient estimates across sample periods
and economy groups is quite transparent in Tables 1-1 and 1-2. To verify it formally, we examine
parameter stability using the Wald test. Specifically, we pool the data from two sample periods,
include variables that are significant in either one of the periods, and test whether the parameters
are constant over the combined sample period. The period pairs considered are 1975 – 1981 vs.
1983 – 1993, 1975 – 1981 vs. 1999-2005, and 1983 – 1993 vs. 1999-2005. The procedure is
applied to both the developed and developing economies. Also, we test the parameter stability for
each of the four groups of explanatory variables.
The Wald test results confirm that the coefficient estimates are significantly different
across any two sample periods.24 The evidence lends support to the view that economies alter
their international reserve holding behaviors before and after major global financial disturbances.
One potential issue with our choice of the sample periods is that there is a five-year gap
between the 1983-1993 and 1999-2005 samples. With the current setting, it is not clear whether
it is the 1994 Tequila crisis or the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis that causes the change in the
international reserve hoarding behavior in the 1990s. To further investigate the underlying reason
of coefficient instability, we test parameter constancy over the two periods 1983-1993 and
1995-2005 that are separated by the 1994 Tequila crisis, as well as that over the 1983-1996 and
1999-2005 periods separated by the Asian financial crisis.
The Wald test results show that, for both developed and developing economies, the
coefficient estimates are significantly different before and after both the Tequila and Asian
financial crises. These findings corroborate our choice of the three sample periods.

4.

Additional Analyses

4.1

Does it Matter if an Economy Is a Developed or Developing One?
What would happen if a developed economy accumulates international reserves as if it

were a developing economy, or vice versa? Let the estimated demand for international reserves
24

For brevity, the Wald test results are not reported here, but are available from the authors.
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of developing economies be

ri ,dp = ĉdp + Wi , dp ' αˆ dp + εˆi ,dp ≡ rˆi ,dp + εˆi ,dp ,

(5)

and that of developed economies be
ri , dd = ĉdd + Wi ,dd ' αˆ dd + εˆi ,dd ≡ rˆi ,dd + εˆi , dd ,

(6)

where “^” indicates a parameter estimate; the subscripts “dp” and “dd” denote developing and
developed economies; Wi ,dp contains the significant factors; αˆ dp is the vector containing the
corresponding estimates; and rˆi ,dp is the predicted level of international reserves. Wi ,dd , αˆ dd ,
and rˆi ,dd are similarly defined.
Suppose a developed economy behaves like a developing economy, what would be its
predicted level of international reserves? One way to address this question is to generate the
“predicted” level of international reserves for this economy by applying its data to equation (5),
which is estimated from the data of developing economies. We label this predicted value ri ,dd .
By comparing rˆi , dd with ri ,dd , one can assess the value (or cost) of being labeled as a developed
economy. Similarly, we can generate ri ,dp for a developing economy using equation (6) and data
from the developing economies. Again, we can infer from rˆi ,dp and ri ,dp the implications of a
developing economy label.
First, we consider the case of a developing economy that behaves like a developed
economy and generate ri ,dp and rˆi ,dp for all four regression specifications (1) to (4). For brevity,
the discussion in this and the following subsection are based on results pertaining to specification
(4), which includes all four types of explanatory variables. Subsample averages are used in place
of missing values.
Figure 3 presents three values of international reserves (as a ratio to GDP) for each
economy: actual levels of international reserves (ri,dp); predicted values from the fitted equation
for the developing economies sample ( rˆi ,dp ) – which we call the “simple” predictions for
simplicity; and predicted values from the fitted equation for the developed economies ( ri , dp ) –
which we call the “cross” predictions. In the figure, the economies are sorted in descending order
(from the left to the right) according to their real per capita GDP in U.S. dollars.
As expected, the simple predictions ( rˆi ,dp ) match the actual values of international
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reserves (ri,dp) quite well. The distribution of the cross predictions ( ri , dp ), on the other hand,
depends on the sample period.
Figure 3: Developing Economies Behave as if They were Developed Economies
A: 1975 - 1981
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In the 1975 – 1981 sample (Panel A), the cross prediction values ( ri ,dp ) appear
consistently above the simple prediction values ( rˆi ,dp ). Also, the gap between rˆi ,dp and ri ,dp
diverges as the level of real per capita income declines. Based on the estimation results in Tables
1-1 and 1-2, we can conjecture that the observed divergence is driven by the negative real output
(per capita) effect found for developed economies in this period. The negative income effect may
reflect the unfavorable conditions faced by low income economies in the international financial
market in the 1970s. Thus, if developing economies were viewed as developed economies in the
late 1970s, these economies, especially those with low per capita income, would have been
required to hold higher levels of international reserves.
For the 1983 – 1993 and 1999-2005 periods, the cross predictions ( ri ,dp ) are quite often
lower than the corresponding simple predictions ( rˆi ,dp ). During these two sample periods, if
developing economies could behave as developed ones, they would hold lower levels of
international reserves. That is, compared with developed economies with similar economic and
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financial conditions, developing economies tend to hold more international reserves. The result
suggests that there are some “intrinsic” differences between developed and developing
economies that are not captured by the explanatory variables considered in the current exercise.
These uncaptured features may include differences in their accessibilities to international
financial markets and vulnerabilities to crises. Unfortunately, we do not have variables to
account for these differences.
Admittedly, it is quite difficult to decipher the numerical values of international reserves
from Figure 3. Table 2 reports the actual values and the two types of predicted values of
international reserves for some Asian economies, the ones that are often perceived to hold an
excessive amount of international reserves, as well as some selected subgroups. In Table 2,
positive values in column (3) mean that a developing economy has a level of international
reserves higher than the simple predicted value ( ri ,dp − rˆi ,dp > 0 ) whereas those in column (5)
mean that the economy has a level of international reserves higher than the one implied by cross
r > 0 ). Column (6) reports the differences between the two predicted values,
prediction ( r − ~
i ,dp

i ,dp

rˆi ,dp − ~
ri ,dp . In general, Table 2 confirms the observations we made with Figure 3.
It is worthwhile noting that the relative magnitudes of the differences in the two types of
predicted values of international reserves vary across sample periods. For example, during the
1983 – 1993 period, the Latin America group gives the largest difference between the two
predicted values (column (6)) while the emerging Asian group yields the smallest. However,
during the 1999-2005 period, the opposite is true for the two groups.
Furthermore, the discrepancies between the two kinds of predictions vary substantially
across the economies. In the 1999-2005 sample, the actual levels of international reserves held
by Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are much higher than the cross predictions.
Singapore is an extreme case – the economy’s actual level of international reserves is slightly
lower than the simple predicted value, but is higher than the cross prediction by 75.0%! Thus, if
the criteria of the developed economies are used to assess adequacy, these developing economies
would be deemed to have an excessive level of international reserves.
Another interesting case is China. During the 1999-2005 sample period, China’s holding
of international reserves is 10.7% lower than the simple predicted value. The degree of
deficiency increases to 144.7% when the cross prediction is used as a reference point! That is,
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Table 2: Developing Economies Behave as if They were Developed Economies

Actual

Estimates based on
developing economy
equations, rˆi ,dp

Errors
(1) - (2)

Estimates based
on developed
economy
equations, ri ,dp

Errors
(1) - (4)

Differences
(2) - (4)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1.
1975 - 1981
Indonesia
5.6%
7.2%
-1.6%
50.1%
-44.5%
-42.9%
Korea
5.3%
7.4%
-2.1%
28.4%
-23.1%
-21.0%
Malaysia
21.3%
19.6%
1.7%
39.7%
-18.3%
-20.0%
Philippines
9.8%
12.0%
-2.1%
40.1%
-30.2%
-28.1%
Singapore
58.3%
56.2%
2.1%
64.7%
-6.4%
-8.5%
Thailand
10.9%
8.1%
2.8%
45.5%
-34.7%
-37.4%
The whole group
8.0%
9.4%
-1.4%
29.3%
-21.3%
-19.9%
Emerging Asia
10.7%
11.5%
-0.8%
42.2%
-31.4%
-30.7%
Latin America
7.7%
7.0%
0.7%
14.4%
-6.8%
-7.4%
Oil Countries
17.9%
16.8%
1.1%
32.3%
-14.4%
-15.5%
2.
1983-1993
China
7.8%
11.7%
-3.9%
11.7%
-3.9%
0.0%
Indonesia
7.3%
6.5%
0.8%
-4.1%
11.4%
10.6%
Korea
4.5%
11.0%
-6.5%
0.7%
3.8%
10.3%
Malaysia
23.8%
20.4%
3.4%
35.7%
-12.0%
-15.4%
Philippines
6.5%
11.1%
-4.6%
-1.0%
7.5%
12.1%
Singapore
70.9%
62.8%
8.1%
73.4%
-2.5%
-10.6%
Thailand
12.8%
13.7%
-0.9%
5.8%
6.9%
7.9%
The whole group
8.4%
9.5%
-1.0%
-1.4%
9.9%
10.9%
Emerging Asia
12.2%
14.4%
-2.2%
7.6%
4.5%
6.7%
Latin America
6.7%
7.1%
-0.4%
-15.7%
22.4%
22.7%
Oil Countries
16.0%
13.3%
2.7%
3.3%
12.7%
10.0%
3.
1999-2005
China
23.0%
33.7%
-10.7%
167.8%
-144.7% -134.0%
Hong Kong
68.1%
61.5%
6.7%
13.8%
54.4%
47.7%
Indonesia
16.0%
19.1%
-3.1%
-8.0%
24.0%
27.2%
Korea
22.9%
20.6%
2.3%
20.7%
2.3%
0.0%
Malaysia
41.9%
26.1%
15.7%
0.9%
41.0%
25.3%
Philippines
20.0%
24.4%
-4.4%
-12.3%
32.3%
36.7%
Singapore
95.9%
97.1%
-1.2%
20.8%
75.0%
76.3%
Thailand
29.2%
30.2%
-1.0%
-9.0%
38.1%
39.1%
The whole group
20.0%
22.0%
-2.0%
37.3%
-17.3%
-15.3%
Emerging Asia
34.9%
32.8%
2.1%
9.4%
25.6%
23.4%
Latin America
9.8%
7.2%
2.6%
-3.4%
13.2%
10.6%
Oil Countries
29.1%
21.8%
7.3%
4.7%
24.4%
17.1%
NOTES: Due to data availability, China is not included in the 1975-81 sample, and Hong Kong is not in
the 1975-81 and 1983-93 samples. The “Emerging Asia” group does not include China. The subsample
average is a real US dollar GDP weighted average. Therefore, the prediction errors for “The whole group”
in columns (3) are not necessarily zero. A positive (negative) error in columns (3) and (5) indicates
over(under)-hoarding of international reserves relative to model predictions.
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both specifications for developing or developed economies suggest that China’s holding of
international reserves should have been higher between 1999 and 2005.
Next, we repeat the exercise for the group of developed economies and present the results
in Figure 4 and Table 3. The panels in Figure 4 show that, generally, the simple prediction values
are lower than the cross prediction ones; if a developed economy were treated as a developing
economy, it would have to hold a higher level of international reserves – a result consistent with
the previous analysis. Comparing the graphs from the three sample periods, the discrepancy
between the two kinds of predicted values is the smallest during the second period.

Figure 4: Developed Economies Behave as if They were Developing Economies
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Table 3 confirms that the group of developed economies holds a level of international
reserves much lower than what is predicted by the fitted model for developing economies.
Interestingly, Japan, one of the largest holders of international reserves, is deemed to have too
few international reserves during the 1999-2005 period; its average level of international reserves
is 12.6% (of its GDP), but the cross prediction indicates that the ratio should be 55.3%.

Table 3: Developed Economies Behave as if they were Developing Economies

1.

Actual

Estimates based
on developed
economy
equations, rˆi ,dd

Errors
(1) - (2)

Estimates based
on developing
economy
ri ,dd
equations, ~

Errors
(1) - (4)

Differences
(2) - (4)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1975 - 1981

U.K.
Germany

5.6%

5.1%

0.5%

44.2%

-38.6%

-39.0%

10.3%

6.8%

3.5%

18.6%

-8.3%

-11.8%

Japan
Average of developed
economies
2.
1983 - 1993

3.4%

9.2%

-5.8%

7.9%

-4.5%

1.3%

6.6%

5.0%

1.6%

14.2%

-7.6%

-9.2%

U.K.

4.8%

10.2%

-5.4%

16.8%

-12.0%

-6.6%

Germany

8.0%

7.1%

0.9%

15.1%

-7.1%

-8.0%

Japan
Average of developed
economies
3.
1999-2005

2.8%

2.8%

0.0%

19.3%

-16.4%

-16.4%

5.4%

6.6%

-1.2%

14.8%

-9.4%

-8.2%

U.K.

2.5%

2.6%

-0.1%

24.8%

-22.4%

-22.3%

Germany

4.1%

5.7%

-1.6%

25.9%

-21.7%

-20.2%

12.6%

12.6%

0.0%

55.3%

-42.6%

-42.6%

4.9%

4.9%

0.1%

32.6%

-27.7%

-27.7%

Japan
Average of developed
economies

NOTES: The average is a real US dollar GDP weighted average. Therefore, the prediction errors for
“Average of developed economies” in columns (3) are not necessarily zero. A positive (negative) error
in columns (3) and (5) indicates over- (under-) hoarding of international reserves relative to model
predictions.

4.2

Over- or Under-Hoarding of International Reserves?
As we stated in the introduction, the recent phenomenal buildup of international reserves

by some developing economies has triggered a contentious debate about whether these
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economies are holding an excessive amount of international reserves and, thus, posing a serious
threat to the stability of the world economy. One traditional rule of thumb indicator of excessive
international reserves holding is whether a country holds international reserves worth more than
three months of imports. As of the end of 2006, the amount of international reserves held by
China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan is worth 16.16, 18.22, 9.24, 5.00, and 15.75 months
of imports, respectively, which is well above the three-month benchmark.
Our analysis, however, has shown that imports are just one of the determinants of the
hoarding behavior. Furthermore, the importance of the propensity to import has been declining
over years. Hence, the assessment of the adequacy of international reserves should go beyond the
consideration of imports. There are additional complexities. For instance, our results in the
previous section suggest that the holding pattern of international reserves has evolved over time.
There is also evidence that, under similar conditions, developing economies tend to hold a level
of international reserves higher than developed economies.
To shed more light on the issue of excessive hoarding in recent years, we generate the
1999-2005 predictions from the empirical equations of international reserves obtained in
different sample periods. For example, the predicted values for developed economies are made
by applying the 1999-2005 data to the fitted equations of developed economies in each of the
three sample periods. The results are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) to (3) in the table are the
same as the corresponding entries in columns (1) to (3) of Panel 3 in Tables 2 and 3 – they are
included for comparison purposes. Columns (4) and (6) list the 1999-2005 predicted values
generated from fitted models of the 1983-93 and the 1975-81 periods, respectively. Columns (5)
and (7) are the prediction errors for columns (4) and (6), respectively.
When the 1999-2005 specifications are used, there is no substantial evidence of
over-hoarding of international reserves. Among the selected Asian economies shown in Table 4,
Malaysia has the highest level of over-hoarding – the excessive amount is more than one half of
its predicted value. China, on the other hand, has the highest deficient rate of 10.7%. Compared
with developing economies, the developed economies display a lower degree of over-hoarding
variability.
The use of the 1975 – 1981 and 1983 – 1993 models presents a different picture. In
general, the actual holdings are lower than the values predicted by these two models. For
developed economies, Japan is the only case that gives an over-hoarding result. Both the U.K.
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Table 4: Predicted Values of the 1999-2005 International reserves from Different Model Vintages

Actual

Estimates based
on the 1999-05
Model

Errors
(1) - (2)

Estimates based
on the 1983-93
Model

Errors
(1) - (4)

Estimates based
on the 1975-81
Model

Errors
(1)-(6)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1.
Developed Economies
U.K.
Germany
Japan
Average of developed economies

2.5%
4.1%
12.6%
4.9%

2.6%
5.7%
12.6%
4.9%

-0.1%
-1.6%
0.0%
0.1%

34.2%
10.5%
7.8%
11.3%

-31.8%
-6.4%
4.8%
-6.4%

10.3%
6.2%
12.1%
3.5%

-7.8%
-2.1%
0.5%
1.4%

2.
Developing Economies
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Average of developing economies
Emerging Asia
Latin America
Oil Countries

23.0%
68.1%
16.0%
22.9%
41.9%
20.0%
95.9%
29.2%
20.0%
34.9%
9.8%
29.1%

33.7%
61.5%
19.1%
20.6%
26.1%
24.4%
97.1%
30.2%
22.0%
32.8%
7.2%
21.8%

-10.7%
6.7%
-3.1%
2.3%
15.7%
-4.4%
-1.2%
-1.0%
-2.0%
2.1%
2.6%
7.3%

201.5%
59.1%
5.8%
49.7%
46.2%
18.9%
57.2%
23.5%
60.9%
40.7%
14.6%
12.7%

-178.5%
9.1%
10.2%
-26.8%
-4.3%
1.1%
38.6%
5.7%
-40.9%
-5.8%
-4.8%
16.4%

33.7%
398.7%
3.7%
20.3%
51.2%
15.4%
273.9%
24.7%
40.2%
87.2%
23.6%
37.7%

-10.7%
-330.5%
12.3%
2.7%
-9.3%
4.6%
-178.0%
4.5%
-20.2%
-52.3%
-13.8%
-8.6%

NOTES: The (subsample) averages real US dollar GDP weighted averages and thus are not necessarily zeros. A positive (negative) error in
columns (3), (5), and (7) indicates over- (under-) hoarding of international reserves. The “Emerging Asia” group does not include China.
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and Germany are deemed to hold too few international reserves in the period. Indeed, Japan
shows a relatively minor change in its estimated over- and under-hoarding positions.
The results for developing economies are quite striking. The predicted values show a high
degree of variation. For instance, the 1983 – 1993 specification suggest Singapore holds the most
“excessive” amount of international reserves (38.6%) and China’s level of international reserves
is lower than the model prediction by a stunning 178.5%. Under the 1975-1981 model, the
Philippines over-hoards by 4.6% while Hong Kong under-hoards by 330.5%.
According to the 1983 – 1993 specification, the group of developing economies on
average has a deficient amount of international reserves; the actual average holding is 6.4% less
than the predicted value. The group of oil exporting economies has the highest level of excessive
holding (16.4%) among the subgroups.
The 1975 – 1981 specification gives an even more severe under-hoarding scenario.
According to this vintage model, developing economies are under-hoarding on average by an
amount of 52.3%. All of the three geographical subgroups hold lower levels of international
reserves than the model predictions. For individual economies, China, Hong Kong, and
Singapore are the three economies that have the largest degrees of under-hoarding – for Hong
Kong and Singapore, the size of international reserves holding is expected to be bigger than their
GDPs!
In sum, the evidence for excessive holdings of international reserves in the 2000s is quite
limited. Indeed, according to the models of the 1970s and 1980s, these selected economies tend
to hold a deficient, instead of an excessive, amount of international reserves. These findings
suggest that, in assessing the adequacy of international reserves, one has to take into account of
both the changing global environment and the evolving role of international reserves.

5.

Concluding Remarks

Against the backdrop of the astonishing growth of global international reserves and the
recent advancements in modeling the demand for international reserves, we conduct an extensive
cross-country analysis to examine the empirical determinants of international reserve holding.
Four groups of determinants, namely, traditional macro variables, financial variables,
institutional variables, and dummy variables that control for individual economy characteristics
are considered. Also, accounting for the anecdotal evidence that major currency crises affect the
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demand for international reserves, we examined three sample periods partitioned by three major
crisis episodes, the 1982 Mexican debt crisis, the 1994 Tequila crisis, and the 1997 Asian
financial crisis.
It is found that the empirical specifications of the demand for international reserves differ
between developed and developing economies and across the three sample periods. Indeed, the
set of significant explanatory variables changes quite substantially across specifications. The
propensity to import variable has the highest frequency of significant coefficient estimates but its
effect appears to be declining over time. Formal Wald statistics confirm parameter non-constancy
and corroborate our choice of sample periods. All in all, the empirical results highlight the
difficulty of devising a single empirical model to describe the holding of international reserves.
They also represent some challenges for building a unified theory of demand for international
reserves.
Besides the changing nature of the estimated relationship, we find that the effects of
financial and institutional factors are also significant contributors in the 1970s and 1980s even
though only recently these factors are the subject of discussions. Our estimation results suggest
that developing economies could hold lower levels of international reserves if they were to be
perceived as developed ones. One interpretation is that, despite our relatively exhaustive list of
explanatory variables, the fitted models do not fully capture the differences between these two
groups of economies. Some possible omitted variables are market credibility and the level of
sociopolitical governance. Unfortunately we do not have data on these variables.
Furthermore, our results do not lend strong support to the assertion that economies
including China, Japan, and Korea are hoarding an excessive amount of international reserves in
the 2000s. Specifically, the predicted values generated from various estimated equations of
international reserves do not indicate a large over-hoarding phenomenon. Instead, the models of
the 1975 – 1981 and 1983 – 1993 vintages suggest that these economies should have higher
levels of international reserves than their actual holding levels in the 2000s. We do identify one
condition under which some developing economies display signs of excessive hoarding in the
2000s – the use of models fitted to developed economies to generate the predicted level of
international reserves.
The continuing process of globalization and the growing importance of capital account
transactions are likely to be the reasons for the changing relationship between international
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reserves and their determinants. Understandably, the changing world economic environment
makes the optimal level of international reserves a moving target. A corollary is that the
assessment of the adequacy of international reserves is a non-trivial enterprise; especially in the
periods that experience significant events in the international arena. Given the occurrence of
dramatic events (both economic and geo-political ones) around the new millennium, it is
reasonable to expect that the demand for international reserves will not be the same as it was in
the past. Hence, the assertions of unusual or excessive hoarding of international reserves must be
made with caution and be evaluated with the flexibility of allowing possible behavioral changes.
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Appendix

1.

Data Appendix
Table A.1 presents the list of the variables considered in the exercise. Only variables that are

found to be statistically significant are reported in the text. The table also provides the definitions of
these variables and the sources of the primary data used to construct these variables. These are annual
data from 1975 to 2005. The sample of economies consists of 22 developed economies and 104
developing economies.

2.

Period Averages of Some Selected Variables
The period averages of the variables are reported in Table A.2. There are some obvious

variations between developed and developing economies and across the three sample periods. While
the two groups of economies have comparable levels of international reserves in the first two sample
periods, there is a noticeable change in the 1999-2005 period. Since the Asian financial crisis,
developing economies have accumulated a substantial amount of international reserves, averaging
more than double that of developed economies.
A few other observations are in order. First, among the developed economies, macroeconomic
variables usually remain relatively stable across the three periods. The developing economies, on the
other hand, experience variations in some variables. For example, both volatilities of international
reserve holdings and export receipts decline over time, a sharp contrast with the developed
economies. The opportunity cost of holding international reserves peaks for the developing
economies in the 1983-1993 period – reflecting the debt crisis in the period – and reverts back to a
lower level in the last period, though still much higher compared to the developed economies.
Second, the financial variables exhibit some discernable differences between the two groups.
The developed economies have a higher monetarization ratio, which is consistent with the perception
that these economies have a higher degree of financial deepening and more advanced capital markets
than the developing ones. The table shows that the group of developing economies is net receivers of
external debt and FDI flows.25 Apparently, for developing economies, FDI flows are gaining
importance recently while external debts peak in the 1983-1993 period.
Third, by eyeballing institutional variables, we can confirm that developed economies have
already achieved high levels of institutional development and democracy in early years. Developing
25

Positive (Negative) net external financial liabilities correspond to net receivers (provider) of external finances.
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economies are on the catch-up trend, but still lagging behind the developed economies. It is
worthwhile noting that the Chinn-Ito (2006, 2008) de jure index of financial openness suggests that
countries have taken different paths of financial liberalization; the developed economies have
constantly implemented financial liberalization since the 1970s while the developing economies
restricted cross-border capital flows during the 1980s, though they rapidly reopened capital accounts
after the mid-1990s (see Chinn and Ito, 2008).
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Table A.1:

Definitions and Sources

Variables

Definitions

Sources

1. Dependent variables
R_GDP

total international reserves (including gold)/current GDP

WDI

2. Variables in “X” – “Macro variables”
RYPC_US
per capita GDP in constant US dollars

WDI

POP

population

WDI

PIMP

propensity to import

IFS

RES_VOL

international reserve volatility

IFS

DIFINT

opportunity cost of holding international reserves

WDI, IFS

3. Variables in “Y” – “Financial variables”
M2Y
M2 to current GDP
NET_DEBT

net debt liabilities / current GDP

WDI, IFS
LM

NET_FDI

net FDI liabilities / current GDP

LM

NET_PORTFOLIO

net portfolio equity liabilities / current GDP

LM

D_DEBT_LIAB

growth rate of net debt liabilities / current GDP

LM

D_FDI_LIAB

growth rate of net FDI liabilities / current GDP

LM

D_PORTFOLIO_LIAB

growth rate of net portfolio liabilities / current GDP

LM

4. Variables in “Z” – “Institutional variables”
KAOPEN
capital account openness
de facto financial openness
DEFACTO_FININT
= (Total external assets + liabilities) / current GDP
TRADEOPEN
de jure trade openness

Chinn-Ito (2006)
LM
WDI

CORRUPT

corruption [0, 6]

ICRG

BQ

bureaucratic quality [0, 6]

ICRG

LAO

law and Order [0, 6]

ICRG

LEFT

dummy variable for left-wing government

DPI2004

PLURAL

dummy variable for parliament with Plural electoral system

DPI2004

GOVFRAC

government fractionalization [0, 1]

DPI2004

POLCONV

political constraint (democracy) index

Henisz (2000)

5. Dummies (“D”)
ER_CRAWL

dummy variable for the crawling peg exchange rate regime

RR

ER_FIX

dummy variable for the fixed exchange rate regime

RR

CRISIS

dummy variable for a currency crisis

Authors’ calculations

BANKCRISIS

dummy variable for a banking crisis

CK

OIL

dummy variable for oil exporting countries

Authors’ calculations

NOTES: The source codes are: BDL: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000, updated in later years); CI:
Chinn and Ito (2006); CK: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); DPI2004: Database of Political Institutions, Beck
et al. (2001); Henisz: Henisz (2000); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International
Financial Statistics; IMF: Other IMF databases; LM: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); Polity IV: Polity IV
project (2004); RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, updated up to 2004); and WDI: World Development
Indicators.
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